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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
consumers are simply paying the cost of the many essential, as
well as luxurious, products traceable either directly or indirectly
to the marine petroleum industry. It is doubtful that this situa-
tion would be tolerated were the oil industry more competitive-
were there no tariffs or import quotas. Only because they enjoy
a privileged position can oil companies get prices to cover such
costs and pass the ultimate burden of Jones Act liability on to
the consumer.
Larry P. Boudreaux, Sr.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS-A HINDSIGHT VIEW OF
TRIAL ATTORNEY EFFECTIVENESS
As a result of federal court decisions extending the right to
counsel in state criminal proceedings,1 a flood of habeas corpus
petitions from state prisoners has come to the federal courts.
2
Many relate to the lack of counsel at some stage of the criminal
proceedings from arrest 3 to appeal, 4 but a large number of them
complain of the lack of "effective" trial counsel.
The right to effective assistance of counsel was first enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,5 an extreme
case in which the trial judge had appointed on the morning of
the trial the entire bar of the county to defend a group of Negro
boys accused of raping two white girls. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the Court, laid down the rather broad pronounce-
ment that failure to make an effective appointment of counsel
violated the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision and
was thus a denial of due process within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment." Justice Black in the later case of Avery
1. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Symposium, Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice, 26 L.A. L. REV. 666, 789 (1966).
2. The right of state prisoners to seek federal habeas corpus was broadened
by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The Court held that
only state remedies "presently" available need be exhausted before petitioning
for habeas corpus in the federal district courts. This eliminated the need to
"exhaust" all state remedies and to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court before seeking relief by habeas corpus. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 705
(1966).
3. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1963).
4. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. Id. at 71.
7. 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
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v. Alabama7 restated the Court's position that the sixth amend-
ment requires effective assistance of counsel.8
Although the Supreme Court has made it clear that the sixth
amendment requires effective assistance of counsel, it has been
left to the lower federal courts to establish standards of trial
attorney effectiveness. These courts have been slow to do so,
perhaps because most judges have experienced the difficulties
of a trial attorney and realize that "the conduct of a case in court
is a peculiar art for which many men, however learned in law
are not fitted."9 They may also see that allegations of ineffective
counsel constitute a direct attack on the attorney's professional
stature and on the profession itself; as members of that profes-
sion, judges are naturally reluctant to be too critical of it or of
its members. 10 It is questionable whether the courts should take
this attitude, as the profession would be better off if ineffective-
ness were exposed and standards of competent trial defense were
outlined.
The courts also fear that liberality in finding lack of effec-
tive counsel may cause a stampede of prisoners claiming their
attorneys were not effective just because they were not acquitted.
It is submitted, however, that such a fear is illusory and perhaps
stems from the loose use of the word "effective" which connotes
results; even the most liberal court could not read the sixth
amendment as requiring representation that will obtain an
acquittal. Rather, the sixth amendment must be read as part of
all the amendments relating to a fair trial. Once this is done, it
is perhaps better to say that counsel must be "adequate" or
8. See Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (proper representation
requires attorney to assume the role of an advocate, rather than that of amicus
curiae) ; Mitchel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955) (ruled against petitioner, but
left little doubt that in proper case, evidence of incompetence of counsel would be
grounds for granting relief) ; Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945) (violation of
due process for state to force a defendant to trial in such a way as to deprive
him of the effective assistance of counsel) ; and to the same effect, White'v. Ragen,
324 U.S. 760 (1945) ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (defendant
was denied effective assistance of counsel because of attorney's conflict of inter-
ests) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) (constitution is not satsified by
mere appointment of counsel; if be is not allowed to prepare his defenses, ap-
pointment would be no more than a "sham"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), (appointment of entire bar on morning of trial).
9. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS EXAMINATION 3 (4th ed. 1936).
10. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1945), where the court
stated that the drafting of habeas corpus petitions had become a game with
prisoners and that enforced leisure hours allowed them to attempt to try their
former counsels through such petitions. See also Jarvi, Effective Representation-
An Evasive Substantive Notion Masquerading as Procedure, 39 WASH. L. REv.
819 (1964).
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"sufficient" enough to see that defendant has a fair trial, i.e.,
that counsel aids defendant in getting the benefit of all constitu-
tional guarantees.
This Comment will explore some of the jurisprudence in an
attempt to point out where attorneys have failed to be "effective"
or "adequate" in criminal cases.
STATUS OF COUNSEL AFFECTING COURT'S VIEW OF COMPETENCE
The problem of inadequate defense counsel has not been
limited to cases in which attorneys were appointed to defend
indigents. There have also been cases in which privately retained
counsel have been found to be inadequate." The courts, however,
have often attached some significance to whether an attorney
was privately retained or court appointed in determining whether
relief should be granted. As a result, a defendant with privately
retained counsel has been denied relief where it would have
probably been forthcoming had counsel been court appointed.;
The two basic justifications put forth for such a distinction have
been (1) that under an agency relationship the acts of the at-
torney are imputed to the client who has retained him,'3 and
(2) that where counsel is privately retained there is no requisite
"state action" denying the defendant's fourteenth amendment
rights.' 4
The making of such a distinction has been severely criticized
by some courts which refuse to adopt it and hold that it is im-
material whether counsel is chosen or appointed.' 5 Upholding
11. E.g., Wilson v. Rose., 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966); Randazzo v. United
States, 339 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1964).
12. Many courts have indicated that a dual standard of competency exists.
E.g., Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 866
(1965) ; Popeko v. United States, 294 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 835 (1963) ; Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Taylor v.
United States, 238 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 938 (1957).
13. E.g., Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 869 (1945) : "The incompetency or negligence of an attorney employed
by a defendant does not ordinarily constitute grounds for a new trial and a for-
tiori will not be grounds for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment....
"The concept of this rule is that the lack of skill and incompetency of the
attorney is imputed to the defendant who employed him, the acts of the attorney
thus becoming those of the client and so recognized and accepted by the court,
unless the defendant repudiates them by making known to the court at the time
his objection."
14. E.g., Dusseldorf v. Teets, 209 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
969 (1954) ; Farrell v. Langan, 166 F.2d 845 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S.
853 (1948).
15. E.g., Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966); Wilson v. Rose,
366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Randazzo v. United States, 335 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.
1964) ; Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962).
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the distinction would have the effect of affording lesser rights
to those who bear the cost of their own defense.16 Also, the pur-
pose of the constitutional guarantee of counsel is to protect the
accused, under the assumption that he knows little law and would
thus be unable to conduct his own defense.'" It would be contrary
to this assumption to say that the defendant should be held to
know when his retained attorney has committed errors, or should
be held to have waived his objection thereto, on any misapplied
agency theory.18
The lack of state action theory falls also when one consilers
that the prisoner who seeks relief was not charged, convicted,
and punished by private individuals, but by the state. 9 Further,
since it is the right of the state to license and control the conduct
of attorneys, it would not be going too far to find state action
where the effectiveness of retained counsel is being attacked.20
CRITERIA BY WHICH COUNSEL'S ADEQUACY IS JUDGED
At what point does the conduct of an attorney constitute in-
competence justifying granting relief to the convicted? The fed-
eral court hearing a habeas corpus petition claiming inadequate
counsel will start with the presumption that the prisoner's rights
were safeguarded by the trial court, and that defense counsel
faithfully performed his duty to protect defendant's rights.2 1
It then becomes incumbent upon the prisoner to prove his right
to relief by showing the incompetency of his counsel. 22 Such a
burden is a heavy one, as the applicant's charge of ineffective-
ness should not be sustained unless it appears well grounded.23
Thus, relief is granted generally in "extreme cases."
The extreme case seems to require that counsel be so ineffec-
tive as to constitute practically no representation at all, thus
reducing the trial to a "farce," a "sham," and a "mockery of
16. Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
17. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for
Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 289, 296-301 (1964)
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
19. Wilson v. Rose, 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966).
20. Ibid.
21. Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966).
22. E.g., Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d &38 (4th Cir. 1959); Diggs v. Welch,
148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
23. Gray v. United States, 299 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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justice." 24 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a
reasonableness approach to determine adequacy of trial counsel:
"We interpret the right to counsel as the right to effective
counsel. We interpret effective counsel to mean not errorless
counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance. ' 25 This court has determined that "reason-
ably effective" assistance means an attorney has used his knowl-
edge, talent, and experience to the best of his ability in defense
of his client.20
The tests for an "extreme" case, as stated, give no objective
standards by which to judge trial counsel's effectiveness and "thus
give no guidance as to what constitutes an effective trial defense.
In an attempt to lay some guidelines the following sections will
present some of the cases in which the courts have considered
habeas corpus petitions alleging ineffective representation by
trial counsel.
SOME SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF INEFFECTIVENESS
As indicated by the above discussion, courts have been re-
luctant to second-guess the considered actions of apparently
qualified attorneys, and tend to dispose of such claims on very
broad principles.2 However, all such claims have not been so
readily denied. Courts have engaged in some hindsight judgment
of attorney effectiveness.
Failure To Object to Defects of Indictment, Composition of Jury,
or Admission of Certain Constitutionally Questionable Evidence
The failure to object to some defect in the indictment is fre-
quently asserted. It has been held that the only defects which
would be serious enough to require a reversal on the grounds of
ineffective counsel would be those violative of due process in
themselves or those affecting a court's jurisdiction, either of
24. E.g., Davis v. Bomar, 344 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Lunce v. Overlade,
244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957) ; United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d
407 (2d Cir.), cot. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953) ; Burton v. United States, 151
F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
25. MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960) ; cert. denied, 368
U.S. 877 (1961).
26. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
27. See, e.g., Tompa v. Virginia ex rel. Cunningham, 331 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.
1964) (mistakes in trial tactics not reviewable) ; Harding v. Logan, 251 F.Supp.
710 (E.D. N.C. 1966). See also Note, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1434 (1965).
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which would vitiate the trial without a finding of incompetent
counsel being necessary.28 Trial attorney's failure to object to
other defects, referred to by the courts as "minor defects," is
held not to imply incompetency.2 9 The principal reasoning behind
this view is that such objections, even if urged usually amount
to no more than delaying tactics and failure to object does not
seriously jeopardize the defendant.
Another often urged inadequacy is failure to object to the
composition of the jury. The Fifth Circuit decided in United
States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole° that failure to object to
systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury will be taken to
constitute inadequate counsel unless satisfactorily explained.
Since that decision, there have been frequent pleas from mem-
bers of minority groups alleging inadequate representation be-
cause of the attorney's failure to object to such practices."' In the
Fifth Circuit at least, such an allegation will seemingly be suc-
cessful as a challenge to trial attorney's effectiveness. 32 It ap-
pears possible, however, that the court was striking at the sys-
tematic exclusion of Negroes from southern juries rather than
evaluating the adequacy of the attorneys who failed to challenge
a defective indictment. 3 3 The question of adequacy of counsel is
not necessarily answered in the face of the violation of due
process by the state in excluding minorities from the jury. This
position is supported by the fact that where the composition of
the jury was not in violation of due process, failure to challenge
its composition has not been held to constitute inadequate repre-
sentation.34
28. Snead v, Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1965) (inconsistency between
counts in indictment) ; Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959) (indictment
failed to describe stolen goods) ; Bostic v. Rives, 107 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664 (1940) (indictment failed to state place of death).
30. 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959) ; Note, 72 YALE
L.J. 559 (193). This view has been criticized in that it requires counsel to
explain his failure to challenge as being a requirement that defense counsel support
his client's conviction. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as
a Ground for Post-Conviction. Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289
(1964).
31. E.g., United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. E.g., Pierce v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1942) (counsel al-
legedly disregarded accused's wish that a juror be challenged); Carruthers v.
Reed, 102 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied. 307 U.S. 643 (1939) (defense
counsel chose not to challenge composition of jury which he knew to be improper
as he erroneously assumed that this would count in accused's favor since the
attorney was personally acquainted with some of the jurors).
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Failure to file a motion to suppress either an illegally ob-
tained confession or illegally obtained evidence often forms the
basis of an alldgation of ineffective counsel. Such allegations
have not frequently met with success,35 although there are at
least two cases in which federal courts have granted relief for
failure to object to an involuntarily obtained confession. 36 In
one of those, however, the court held that the representation
amounted to a total failure to present the cause of accused since,
in addition to the failure to object to the confession before trial,
it found a failure to call certain witnesses who could have estab-
lished defendant's innocence and a failure to introduce certain
vital evidence.37 In the other case the court seemed to be more
occupied with the invalidity of the confession upon which the
conviction rested than with trial counsel's ineffectiveness in fail-
ing to object to it.3 8 It is thus somewhat doubtful whether coun-
sel would be found to be ineffective merely on the allegation of
failure to object to constitutionally questionable evidence. 39 Re-
cently, however, the Fifth Circuit remanded a case to district
court to determine if a confession was involuntary and indicated
that counsel's failure to ascertain this and to object constituted
ineffective counsel.40
Thus, it appears the courts are reluctant to find incompetence
on the part of an attorney who has failed either to object to
defects in the indictment, or to composition of the jury, or to
constitutionally questionable evidence. It is clear, however, that
when such failure is one of a series of omissions that reduces the
trial to a sham or a farce, habeas corpus relief will be granted.41
Further, where the composition of the jury, the evidence or con-
fession admitted, or the defective indictment themselves vitiate
35. E.g., Wilkins v. United States, 258 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1958) and Martin
v. United States, 248 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (failure to move for suppression
of evidence obtained as result of an illegal search) ; Bowen v. United States, 192
F.2d 515 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 943 (1951), (failure to object to an
illegally obtained confession). But cf. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 386 P.2d
487 (1963) (failure to object to introduction of illegally obtained evidence was
held to have deprived defendant of an adequate defense).
36. Ledbetter v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.
1966) ; Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
37. Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
38. Ledbetter v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.
1966).
39. See Bowler v. Maryland, 236 F. Stpp. 400 (D. Md. 1964), where the court
specifically held that the attorney's failure to urge the unconstitutional aspects of
a confession did not constitute incompetence.
40. Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966).
41. See, e.g., Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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the trial, relief will be granted.12 It is difficult to determine in
this latter situation if the court is striking at the lack of adequate
counsel, since it is likely that the courts would have reversed
even if the lack of effective counsel question had never been
raised. It is submitted, however, that if counsel's effectiveness
were to be judged in these situations, the courts could generally
find inadequate counsel, since allowing his client to be convicted
by use of unconstitutional means would not be aiding him in
obtaining a "fair trial," in the absence of special reason.
Failure To Urge or Perfect Particular Available Defenses
Courts realize the matter of choosing which defenses to urge
strikes at the heart of trial strategy.43 Their reluctance to find
inadequate representation for failure to urge particular defenses
is especially strong where the alleged abandoned defense was a
bizarre or unsupported one suggested by the defendant. Attor-
neys are not required to urge defenses which they intelligently
and in good faith do not believe to be supported by the facts,44
nor to work miracles with wild defense stories. 45 One of the most
frequently pleaded failures is the attorney's neglect to or choice
not to urge insanity as a defense. Such petitions are usually
disallowed, especially where insanity would have been incon-
sistent with the defenses that were urged.46 But where defense
counsel failed to properly plead the defense of insanity where
it was the only defense urged, petitioner was deprived of effec-
tive representation. 47
Generally, where it has been alleged that trial counsel failed
to urge an apparently available defense, as a result of ignorance
or neglect rather than as a deliberate choice, courts have been
willing to hold that the petitioner's claim would support the
granting of habeas corpus relief.48 The test of competency in
this area would thus seem to be whether the attorney intelligently
42. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Goldgby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 850 (1959).
43. See United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), ajf'd,
244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). See also Waltz,
Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction
Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 313-18 (1964).
44. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 357 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1966); White
v. Hancock, 355 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1966).
45. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 854 (1958).
46. See, e.g., James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Snider v. Cunning-
ham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1961).
47. Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
48. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962).
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looked at the available defenses to determine which were sound-
est and in the best interest of his client. To apply this test the
court will look at the circumstances to determine if the attorney
had enough time to discover possible defenses and to contemplate
the wisdom of urging them. 49 If this minimum test is met, there
should be no finding of ineffectiveness on the part of the trial
attorney, due process being satisfied though all available defenses
were not urged.
Failure To Call Particular Witnesses and Refusal To Allow
Defendant to Testify
Closely allied to the failure to urge available defenses is the
failure to call particular witnesses whom the person convicted
claims would have cleared him of the charges.50 Is is usually held
that determination of which witnesses to call is a question of
judgment for the attorney because he is usually in a better posi-
tion to ascertain which ones are telling the truth and whether
they would do his client more harm than good. 51 However, failure
to call witnesses who will establish a substantial defense will
lend weight to a final determination of ineffective representation
where that omission is one of several failings of counsel in the
course of trial.52
The decision not to allow defendant to take the stand in his
own defense is often put forth as evidence of the trial attorney's
incompetency. The courts have held this to be an exercise of
trial strategy or tactics because of the many legitimate reasons,
including the accused's vulnerability to cross-examination, which
may combine to dictate a determination not to call the accused
as a witness.5 3 Only where the attorney refused to allow a de-
fendant to testify in his own behalf against the defendant's ex-
pressed wishes and in the presence of strong circumstances in-
dicating the favorable value of his testimony would the court
consider such evidence as indicating an attorney's incompetence. 54
49. Martin v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966).
50. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for
Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289, 318-19 (1964).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Lewis
v. Sanford, 79 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
52. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Jones v. Huff,
152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; United States ex rel. Hall v. Ragen, 60 F. Supp.
820 (N.D. Il1. 1945).
53. See, e.g., Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); Newsom v. Smyth, 261 F.2d 452 (4th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 969 (1959).
54. Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963).
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It is submitted that the courts are justified in their reluctance
to second guess counsel's judgment as to what defenses to urge
and what witnesses to present. Often the reasons behind a par-
ticular strategy in this area are outside the formal record and
beyond the scope of judicial analysis. About the only indication
of trial counsel's incompetence in these matters of strategy are
the allegations of the supposedly unqualified convict. 55 Courts
thus justifiably decline to give the petitioner an opportunity to
learn whether a different strategy, involving his own testimony
and that of witnesses chosen by him, would result in his ac-
quittal.5 6
Failure to Present or Object to Evidence and to Cross Examine
In general, courts have refused to vacate a conviction because
trial counsel failed to adduce certain testimony,57 failed to raise
objections to evidence offered by the prosecution,5 8 or failed to
cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses. 59 The courts are re-
luctant to grant relief on these bases because it is generally
impossible to determine whether the attorney was ignorant or
negligent in his failure, or was simply exercising his judgment
as to proper strategy. This is especially true in cases of failure
to object to evidence, since frequent objections may prejudice
the court or the jury against the defendant's case. As to failure
to cross-examine, courts realize that there are many situations
where cross-examination may be fruitless or even prejudicial, as
where the witness is obviously hostile and it is questionable that
he could be shaken.0 0
There are a few cases, however, where the courts have been
willing to find ineffective representation and grand habeas cor-
pus relief in the basis of these allegations.0 1 However, these con-
tained other failings which in combination helped the courts
55. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Sumpter, 111 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. N.Y. 1953)
United States v. Cameron, 84 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Miss. 1949).
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949); Farley v.
Skeen, 107 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. W. Va. 1952).
58. See, e.g., Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Stanley v.
United States, 239 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Moon v. Peyton, 257 F. Supp. 998
(E.D. Va. 1966).
59. See, e.g., Shuman v. Peyton, 361 F. 2d 646 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Nutt v.
United States, 335 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1964).
60. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for
Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289 (1964).
61. See e.g., Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Johnson v. United
States, 110 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; United States ex rel. Hall v. Ragen, 60
F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
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determine that there was ineffectiveness. It is submitted that,
in the absence of such other combination of circumstances, courts
would be unwilling to find a lack of effective representation on
the alleged failure to present or object to certain evidence, or
failure to cross-examine certain prosecution witnesses, due to the
reluctance to engage in second guessing an attorney's use of
judgment. The great weight of the cases would tend to support
this view.6
Failure to Ask For or Object to Instruction and Failure to
Present Arguments
A plea frequently made by unsuccessful defendants is that
counsel failed to request or object to instructions, or failed to
present arguments to the jury. Where the court finds that the
charge fully and fairly presented the accused's defensive posi-
tion, the failure to request or object to instructions does not form
the basis of habeas corpus relief.0 3 Where, however, defense
counsel has failed to request or object to an instruction on an
issue crucial to his case, the courts have held that this is grounds
for relief.6 4 It has been suggested however, that these holdings
may be based on the independent error of the trial court in allow-
ing the instructions rather than a finding of counsel's ineffec-
tiveness.05 An exception seems to exist where the failure of coun-
sel to ask for or object to instruction is based on his complete
lack of preparation for the case.66
Failure to present arguments to the jury is held to be a
matter for counsel's judgment which is regarded as insufficient
to justify setting aside the conviction. 7 However, it has been
held that counsel's refusal to present arguments to the jury
because of his own pre-judgment of his client's guilt constitutes
"ineffective" representation.68
62. See cases cited 74 A.L.R.2d 1390, 1455-56 (1960).
63. See, e.g., Kearney v. Peyton, 360 F.2d 589 (4th Cir. 1966); Kilgore v
United States, 323 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1963).
64. See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 886 (1958) ; Lance v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
65. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-
Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289, 326 (1964).
66. Pineda v. Bailey, 340 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1965).
67. Hickman v. United States, 246 F.2d 178 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
874 (1957).
68. Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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COMMENTS
CONCLUSIONS
In their hindsight view, the federal courts have failed to lay
down clear standards by which attorneys can be guided in their
efforts to defend the accused. The somewhat nebulous terms
used by the courts have, however, given them the flexibility to
handle each case on its own facts, a situation which is not neces-
sarily undesirable.
.This does not, however, give guidance to the attorney faced
with a criminal defense appointment, in determining how he can
avoid being found to have rendered inadequate or ineffective
aid to the accused. It has been held that court-appointed attor-
neys owe their clients the same duty imposed on a conscientious,
diligent, and honorable employed counsel under the same circum-
stances. 9 Canon Five of the American Bar Association Canons
of Professional Ethics gives guidance to all counsel for defend-
ants in criminal cases. It lays down as a standard that an attor-
ney should use "all fair and honorable means to present every
defense that the law permits to the end that no person may be
deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law." 70
Canon Five's broad language really indicates that what is
required is to see that the accused has a fair trial. Since a fair
trial connotes something less than perfection but yet more than
a farce or a sham, it becomes incumbent upon the courts to bal-
ance fair trial for the accused against their natural reluctance
to second guess trial counsel. If the courts would engage in this
balancing, it is submitted that they should favor a fair trial for
the accused, and any reservation about second guessing trial
counsel would have to be set aside.
In concluding, an additional problem might be raised-the
duty of the trial judge with respect to both the attorney ap-
pointed by him to represent the indigent accused and to the
attorney retained by the accused. Does the trial judge discharge
his duty to the indigent by the mere appointment of an attorney
to represent him? It has been suggested in several fairly recent
cases that the trial judge has the additional duty of seeing that
69. Hoard v. Dutton, 360 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Williams v. Beto, 354
F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Jackson v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Texas
1966).
70. As quoted in Jackson v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 175, 183 (N.D. Texas
1966).
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his appointments do an effective job in securing a fair trial.7 1
What, however, is the trial judge's duty when retained counsel
commits errors which prejudide an accused's right to fair trial?
It is submitted that in this situation the judge may have some
duty to privately advise the retained attorney of errors noted by
the court, because of the general duty of the judge to conduct a
fair trial. Caution should be exercised, however, so that the
judge cannot be accused of interfering with the defendant's
freedom to choose his own counsel.
Lawrence L. Jones
INVITEE STATUS IN LOUISIANA
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally the standard of care owed by an occupier of
land to one entering upon the land has been determined by the
circumstances surrounding the entry. In determining this stand-
ard, courts have considered two elements, the consent of the oc-
cupier and the economic benefit derived by him from the visit.
Based on these considerations the common law has recognized
three broad statuses: trespassers, licensees, and invitees. The
trespasser, coming on the land without the consent of the oc-
cupant and with no intention of bestowing an economic benefit,
takes the premises as he finds them. The landowner owes no
duty other than not to harm him intentionally.' The licensee
is on the land with an expressed or implied invitation from the
occupant, but with no purpose of rendering an economic benefit. 2
However, licensee status has also been given one who enters with-
out the required invitation, but who intends to bestow some real or
fancied benefit on the occupier.3  The standard of care owed is
not to injure the licensee wilfully or wantonly or cause him harm
from active negligence. The occupier must also warn the licensee
against all known hidden hazards. 4 The invitee comes on the
71. Braxton v. Peyton, 365 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Jones v. Cunningham,
313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Mackenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960).
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 333 (1965) Barrilleaux v. Noble Drilling
Corp., 160 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 60, at 385 (3d ed. 1964) Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash
& Door Works, Inc., 68 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
3. Malatesta v. Lowry, 130 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Mercer v.
Tremont & R. Ry., 19 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944) (plaintiff was granted
invitee status) ; Mills v. Heidingsfield, 192 So. 786 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 341 (1965) ; Potter v. Board of Comm'rs,
148 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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